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In this paper we will map and analyze Australian border surveillance technologies. In doing so, we wish to 
interrogate the extent to which these surveillance practices are constitutive of new regimes of regulation and 
control. Surveillance technologies, we argue, are integral to strategies of risk profiling, social sorting and 
“punitive pre-emption.” The Australian nation-state thus mirrors broader global patterns in the government 
of mobility, whereby mobile bodies are increasingly sorted into kinetic elites and kinetic underclasses. 
Surveillance technologies and practices positioned within a frame of security and control diminish the 
spaces that human rights and social justice might occupy. It is therefore imperative that critical scholars 
examine the moral implications of risk and identify ways in which spaces for such significant concerns 







Since the attacks of September 11 Australian authorities have increasingly redefined 
mobility as a problem of security. Such a redefinition has endeavored to position mobility 
“above the realm of normal politics” where considerations of social justice are evaded and 
questions of “effectiveness” emerge as paramount (Loader 2002: 137). This securitization 
agenda is operationally apparent through the amplification of surveillance practices on 
and beyond the border.3 Aas (2005) has argued that in a world characterized by global 
flows, zones and networks, it is technology, rather than geography, that increasingly 
defines the space of governance. The policing of global mobility now takes place in 
“informated space” through transnational networks aimed at the “bureaucratic production 
of knowledge about suspect populations” (Sheptycki 1998: 70). Advance passenger 
processing, the compilation of databases of “high risk” travelers, the biometric 
identification of asylum seekers and biometric passports are all developments that 
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evidence and simultaneously reinforce the increasing securitization of mobility. Bigo has 
suggested that across the global north the “securitization of immigration is the result and 
not the cause of the development of technologies of control and surveillance” (2002: 73, 
emphasis added). This may overstate the constitutive role of technology in processes of 
securitization. Nevertheless, where leading-edge technologies operate beyond borders in 
“transnational interstices of state power” (Sheptycki 1995: 629), they frequently emerge 
in advance of legal legitimation and systems of constraint. 
 
In this paper we will map and analyze Australian border surveillance technologies 
operating within the interstitial spaces of international air travel. In doing so, we wish to 
interrogate the extent to which these surveillance practices are constitutive of new 
regimes of criminalization and control. We argue that the anticipatory regimes of border 
control which govern these spaces, while primarily risk reducing in their mentality, may 
be punitive in their effect. Following Johnston and Shearing (2003) we characterize these 
hybrid governmentalities as regimes of “punitive preemption.” Punitive preemption may 
incorporate a range of disciplinary, punitive and militaristic technologies aimed at 
preempting arrival at the physical border (Weber forthcoming). While military 
surveillance strategies have been a prominent feature of interdiction measures intended to 
preempt arrival in Australia by sea, a detailed analysis of these practices is beyond the 
scope of this article. Here we wish to interrogate the extent to which bureaucratic forms of 
surveillance connected with international air travel are constitutive of these new 
anticipatory regimes of regulation and control. 
 
We argue that surveillance technologies are integral to strategies of punitive preemption 
based on “social sorting” – the filtering of individuals in relation to coded categories of 
high or low risk (Lyon 2003). The Australian nation-state thus mirrors broader global 
patterns in the government of mobility, whereby mobile bodies are increasingly sorted 
into kinetic elites and kinetic underclasses (Adey 2006). Bauman has described the same 
process in terms of the ideal types of “global tourists” and “global vagabonds” (1993: 
240-243).  The deployment of surveillance technologies and practices in the Australian 
context serves in the production of the two tiers of mobility he identifies as “the 
extraterritoriality of the new global elite and the forced territoriality of the rest” (Bauman 
2000: 221). These practices of selective immobilization have human rights implications in 
relation to asylum seekers, and raise broader questions of social justice in a world 
increasingly divided into the “mobility rich” and “mobility poor” (Pickering and Weber 
2006; Wilson 2006; Wonders 2006). 
 
 
Securitization and Preemption of Informated Space 
 
The heightened regulation and surveillance of borders occurs within a political context in 
which social problems are increasingly reconfigured as problems of security. Prior to the 
events of September 11, Simon (1997) noted the increased tendency in the US to “govern 
through crime,” whereby criminal justice solutions were widely advanced for social 
problems. Loader (2002) has identified parallel trends in the “securitization of Europe,” 
including the identification of unregulated border crossing as a security concern. Australia 
has witnessed similar developments, and this can be attributed to changes in governance 
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during the 1980s, whereby neo-liberal states moved away from the provision of services 
to promoting and promising safety – a promise intertwined with the rise of “law and 
order” politics (McCulloch 2004a). Post September 11 there has been an amplification of 
this trend as social and economic problems are progressively reconfigured and interpreted 
through the prism of security (McCulloch 2004b). This securitization is manifested 
externally as well as internally. Thus in Australia, as elsewhere in the global north, cross 
border mobility is increasingly viewed as an external and internal security threat. In fact, 
in the context of the challenges to state sovereignty presented by globalization, it could be 
argued that irregular border crossing has attained a preeminent status as a political symbol 
of national insecurity, and therefore as a focus for governmental control. Faced with the 
contradictions and insecurities arising from “globalization,” developed states have sought 
to reinforce their territorial borders when, on many other levels, the salience of borders 
has been in decline (Weber and Pickering 2006). Sassen has identified border crossing as 
a “strategic site of inquiry about the limits of the new order” (1996: xvi).  
 
A consequence of governing mobility through the prism of security has been the 
progressive criminalization of spontaneous border crossing by asylum seekers and others. 
Criminalization has been evident at the level of political discourse (Pickering 2001) and 
in punitive practices such as fingerprinting and administrative detention of targeted 
groups (Pickering 2005; Weber 2002; Welch and Schuster 2005). However, mirroring 
trends in crime control (Garland 1996), criminalization and deterrence regimes have 
increasingly been supplemented with more pragmatic measures aimed at reducing and 
managing risk in the face of persistently high levels of border crossing. Feeley and Simon 
(1994) predicted that the development of risk management policies would be a likely 
response to the diminishing ability to control global mobility through conventional means. 
Aradau and Van Munster argue that risks such as terrorism, which are judged to be both 
unmanageable through the normal prudential techniques of social sorting, and irreversible 
in their effects, mobilize a range of precautionary technologies including war, generalized 
surveillance, and decisive administrative action based not on specific knowledge but on 
attributions of dangerousness. They note that these technologies span the whole space 
between two definitions of securitization, which is between “exceptional measures and 
the immediacy of action on the one hand” and the “ordinary administrative, police or 
insurance measures on the other” (2007: 98). This recognition of both exceptional 
(punitive) and routine (administrative) applications of precautionary principles appears to 
be congruent with the hybrid mentalities of punitive preemption discussed earlier in 
relation to border control. The equating of uncontrolled border crossing with loss of 
sovereignty, and its conflation with the terror threat, has elevated border anxiety to the 
status of a catastrophic risk against which governments have been prepared both to take 
urgent action (such as the landing of armed troops on the MV Tampa and the assembling 
of the Pacific Solution4) while also investing in more routine preemption regimes.  
 
The growth of administrative risk reducing strategies has been attended by a substantial 
expansion of database processing capacity and surveillance infrastructure intended to 
                                                     
4 The absolute refusal of the Australian government to allow the landing on Australian soil of a Norwegian 
merchant vessel which had rescued stricken asylum seekers en route from Indonesia sparked a preemptive 
regime of naval interdiction and offshore detention which have been widely discussed elsewhere (see 
Carrington 2006; Taylor 2005a; Weber 2006; Weber forthcoming). 
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strengthen border control processes. This information capacity is linked inextricably to 
the yearning for “risk knowledge” observed by Ericson and Haggerty (1997) in relation to 
police surveillance. As Lyon notes, risk knowledge is increasingly synonymous with 
information technologies and databases (2006a: 73). Information technology has also 
been pivotal in the externalization of the border. Aas has observed that new technologies 
“seem both to transform the traditional space of government and to disrupt territorial 
boundaries,” as well as appearing to provide the most efficient solution to problems of 
risk and security (2005: 207). The borders of the global north are fast becoming high-tech 
borders, “capable of materializing in different sites around the globe” (Walters 2006: 
197). Actuarial logic requires that containment measures be applied before any harm 
results (Rose 2000, Shearing and Johnston 2005). Risk thinking in relation to border 
control therefore leads inexorably to temporal, and hence spatial, displacement of the 
border. Weber has discussed elsewhere the dispersal of the border to multiple “sites of 
enforcement,” both internal and external to the physical border of the state (Weber and 
Bowling 2004). The delocalised, technologically realized border is “performed” by state 
agents on traveling bodies rather than drawn as a line on a map (Wonders 2006); is 
functional rather than physical (Weber 2006), and significantly reorganizes the spatiality 
of power (Walters 2006).   
 
The logic of exclusion inherent in border control, coupled with mentalities of “risk 
reduction” and corresponding information technologies, produces strategies of 
“preemptive immobilization” aimed at certain categories of traveler who conform to set 
criteria. These risk profiles are constructed using aggregate information about suspect 
populations, and applied through information technologies accessed by immigration 
authorities and their agents on or before the border. Surveillance technologies therefore 
expand the potential codes and categories of risk (O’Malley 2006). Increasingly, these 
aggregate techniques of exclusion bear little relationship to any “objective” measure of 
individual risk.  Numerous commentators have noted a widespread blurring of the 
distinction between individual suspicion and guilt in the name of collective security (e.g. 
Coleman and Sim 2005; Zedner forthcoming; McCulloch and Carlton 2006). With respect 
to Australian border controls, Taylor has noted that, while every asylum seeker who has 
managed to evade preemptive measures to reach Australian shores by sea has been 
subjected to mandatory detention and security screening, none had been assessed as 
posing an actual individual security risk (Taylor 2005a).5 Individual checking may be 
applied within these categories, both at and before the border, using persons of interest 
databases (such as the MAL system discussed later) or other discretionary methods. 
However, these operational practices are not discernible in official documentation and are 
largely beyond the scope of this discussion.6 The generalized image of threat and danger 
associated with illegalized border crossing has been hotly contested by critical 
                                                     
5 This applied up to 30 June 2003. Since then, a single offshore detainee was refused entry to Australia on 
security grounds but later accepted as a refugee elsewhere, raising doubts about the security assessment. 
6 The focus of this discussion is the early screening out of travelers at visa issuing and transit stages of 
travel, through the use of aggregate level sorting mechanisms, not on the more humanly mediated 
mechanisms which may apply on arrival at the physical border (for which see Parsley 2003). It is 
important to note that recent Australian immigration policy has been remarkable for its attempt to shrink 
the spaces available for individual discretion and has been criticized on these grounds by the UN Human 
Rights Committee, for example, in relation to the use of detention (A v Australia (1997) Communication 
No. 560/1993, CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993, 30/4/1997).  
Wilson and Weber: The Australian Border 
Surveillance & Society 5(2) 
 
128
commentators, particularly in the case of asylum seekers who should benefit from the 
universal right to seek sanctuary from persecution (see for example Green and Grewcock 
2002, Pickering 2001, Welch and Schuster 2005). However, paradigms of risk are largely 
blind to considerations of individual circumstance and, particularly when operating within 
the “transnational interstices of state power,” may become detached from the normal 
constraints of territorially-based legal regulation (Sheptycki 1995: 629). 
 
 
The Australian Border: Politics and Policy 
 
Although indicative of patterns of border securitization across the global north, the 
surveillance and policing of the Australian border has a specific genealogy. While the 
number of displaced persons crossing Australia’s borders is numerically far less than in 
the EU or US, the specific history of Australia as a colonial settlement infuses the border 
with potent political symbolism (Carrington 2006: 198). As a British colony situated in 
the Asia Pacific region Australia has a history of invasion anxiety fired by xenophobic 
narratives which envisage the white Australian nation being overrun by Asiatic multitudes 
descending from the north (Burke 2001). These racialized narratives have informed and 
intensified the contemporary politicization and securitization of border control in 
Australian public debate. The merging of border anxiety and security was nowhere clearer 
that in Australia’s federal election campaign of 2001. On 26 August 2001 a Norwegian 
vessel, the MV Tampa, arrived off the Australian coast carrying 430 asylum seekers, 
primarily of Afghani and Iraqi origin, who had been rescued from a leaky boat attempting 
the journey from Indonesia to Australia. The incident supplied Prime Minister John 
Howard with an emotive issue that unleashed entrenched fears within the Australian 
electorate about invasion, outsiders and the defense of national sovereignty (McCulloch 
2004a; Marr & Wilkinson 2003). The attack of September 11 only two weeks after the 
arrival of the Tampa in Australian waters propelled border security to the centre of the 
electoral debate and conflated the identities of asylum seekers with potential terrorist 
threats (McCulloch 2004a).  
 
Since then, Australia has witnessed an acceleration of expenditure on human and 
technological security measures at and beyond the border. This has involved the 
development of an extensive searchable database capacity, the deployment of biometric 
technology, increased interoperability and data exchange between government agencies, 
increased cooperation and interoperability with other nation-states beyond the territorial 
border and the extensive deployment of human surveillance. Examples of expanding 
human surveillance capacities include overseas networks of federal police and 
immigration liaison officers tasked with monitoring and disrupting people smuggling 
activities, and enhanced coastal surveillance coupled with military interdiction at sea. 
These efforts have been supported by significant investments in information technology, 
the establishment of intelligence coordination centres both onshore and offshore, and the 
installation of secure satellite tracking systems on coastal surveillance vessels (ACS 
2006c, DIMIA  2005; see also Pickering 2004; Taylor 2005b; Weber forthcoming; Weber 
2006).7  
                                                     
7 Over the last decade the government department responsible for immigration has been known as the 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA), the Department of Indigenous, Immigration 
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These developments are consistent with a growing “market in security” described by 
Garland (1997), amongst others, primarily in relation to technology. It has been observed 
that the government is one of the key consumers of security products in “the fear 
economy” (Davis 2001). The Australian government has also been an active exporter of 
border surveillance technologies, and of risk reducing border control policies more 
generally. Annual reports and ministerial press releases note that training for airline staff 
in detection of fraudulent documents has been provided by Australian officials in a wide 
range of countries, and that the expertise of Australian border control officials is in high 
demand, for example through “capacity-building” initiatives in countries such as 
Indonesia, Afghanistan and Papua New Guinea (DIMIA 2004). Moreover, this 
exemplifies the active creation of a market for Australian border control expertise: a 
demand for this knowledge is first generated via the imposition of carrier sanctions 
(discussed later), then filled through capacity building training.  
 
The Australian government has also promoted the development of computerized 
Advanced Passenger Information (API) systems in countries of transit, through so-called 
“pathfinder” projects endorsed by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group. 
By 2004, API Feasibility Studies had reportedly been conducted in South Korea, Chile 
and Tapei, with more studies planned, for example, in the People’s Republic of China 
(DIMIA 2004). The same report cited capacity building exercises in over 20 Asia-Pacific 
and Middle Eastern countries covering border management assessments; system design 
and implementation; establishment of document examination laboratories, including the 
creation of an Identity Checking Unit in Afghanistan; assistance with legal drafting; 
provision of equipment and training in detection of document fraud, assistance with 
immigration intelligence, and English language training.  Coupled with the placement of 
Australian immigration officials at key points of transit to Australia, the Australian 
government has therefore created a formidable offshore network which operates to sort, 
immobilize and preempt unwanted arrivals at the physical border. 
 
 
Surveillance and Pre-emption: APP, MAL and RMAL 
 
Australia operates its offshore border through a computerized information network called 
Advance Passenger Processing (APP). Salter discusses the delocalization of the border 
function through visas (Salter 2006). Australia enforces a system of universal visa 
coverage, supported by highly developed information technologies and comprehensive 
surveillance. The system enables information exchange, passenger monitoring and 
administrative processing to commence from the time an intending passenger applies for a 
visa or attempts to board a flight for Australia. The preemptive mentality which underlies 
this approach is clear from this extract from an immigration department report: “Australia 
manages the movement of non-citizens across its border by, in effect, pushing the border 
offshore. This means that checking and screening starts well before a person reaches our 
physical border” (DIMIA 2004: 3). Electronic travel authorities (ETAs) are available to 
                                                                                                                                                               
and Multicultural Affairs (DIMIA) and the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC). For 
consistency the generic term immigration department will be used throughout, unless citing a particular 
publication or where used in a direct quotation. 
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favored nationalities with low recorded risk profiles. These profiles are constructed from 
aggregate statistics on breaches of visa conditions (a putative illegal practice) and in-
country applications for asylum (a completely legal practice), and are doubtlessly 
influenced by foreign policy concerns. The name of the document is revealing in itself. It 
is an electronic travel authority - effectively a mobility permit, not simply a permission to 
enter Australia. This shift of focus to points of embarkation and transit constitutes a 
preemptive performance of the Australian border at points far distant from its physical 
location, aimed at selective immobilization. Coupled with carriers’ liability sanctions 
which force the cooperation of commercial airline officials in screening and sorting 
passengers on behalf of the Australian state, Australian immigration authorities are 
effectively regulating mobility through informated spaces over which they have no 
legitimate sovereign control (Taylor 2005b). 
 
The process of social sorting inherent in Advance Passenger Processing is evident not 
only in the profiles applied within the system, but in the initial distinction between 
electronic and paper applications. Sorting therefore commences from the time of 
application to travel, long before presentation at an international port. Intending travelers 
from “suspect” nationalities are subjected to greater scrutiny by Australian visa 
processing officials and have their photograph kept on file. Those from nationalities 
whose “suspect status” with respect to non-compliance with border controls is routinely 
assumed, are likely to have their visa refused. This is particularly true of nationalities 
which account for a significant proportion of onshore asylum applications, even though 
unlawful arrival in order to lodge an asylum application is permissible under international 
refugee conventions. Taylor has observed that “[a]s a result of DIMIA’s ever improving 
“risk management” techniques, potential asylum seekers are less and less likely to be 
granted visas for travel to Australia as evidenced by the downward trend in the proportion 
of visitor visa entrants making protection visa applications over the past few years” 
(Taylor 2005b). This points to the effectiveness of offshore screening in immobilizing 
“high risk travelers,” a practice which potentially leads to refoulement of refugees (that is, 
forced return to danger) and other breaches of the right to seek asylum. It is notable that 
the APP system is also geared towards improving the efficiency of processing “low risk” 
passengers. These official practices are therefore instrumental in the formation of both 
kinetic elites and kinetic underclasses (Adey 2006).  
 
The Advance Passenger Processing (APP) system is supported by an extensive network of 
Airline Liaison Officers (ALOs) who work closely with commercial airline employees to 
screen passengers during check-in and boarding. Since Australian immigration officials 
have no statutory powers in the interstitial spaces of international airports, it is an airline 
employee who technically makes the decision about whether to allow a passenger to 
board. However, these decisions are based on a directive generated by the APP system 
that it is “OK to Board” or “Not OK to Board,” so that social sorting in compliance with 
Australian border control policies is generally achieved. Final checking of authorization 
to enter is conducted by Australian Customs officials at the physical border. However, 
long before a traveler arrives at the border, an EMR (expected movement record) will 
have been generated to ensure that “Australian border agencies are aware of the expected 
travel to Australia of all persons and can tailor their response accordingly” (DIMIA 2004: 
4).  
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Preemption of unauthorized arrival is also facilitated by the Movement Alert List (MAL). 
The MAL system is a computer database storing details of individuals and travel 
documents that are believed to be of “immigration concern.” MAL alerts may be based 
purely on previous immigration history, or may relate to intelligence information fed into 
the system by security services, visa issuing authorities abroad, or the Australian Federal 
Police (AFP). The AFP’s Promise system and the PACE and PAES (Passenger Analysis 
and Evaluation System) databases managed by the Australian Customs Service, are linked 
in various combinations by a series of Memoranda of Understanding (David 2000). This 
extensive network of data sharing extends the scope of surveillance beyond the APP 
system, to incorporate assessments of risk at a more individualized level. While it is not 
clear whether MAL alerts are available routinely during all stages of offshore passenger 
processing, it seems they are accessed by officials charged with issuing visas abroad 
through the Travel and Immigration Processing System (TRIPS). The MAL system is 
promoted by immigration authorities as a “key tool” in applying legislation governing the 
entry to and presence in Australia of “non-citizens who are of character concern” (DIMA 
2006). While MAL may not raise the objections associated with the aggregate level 
profiling characteristic of the APP system, questions of data integrity and due process are 
likely to arise, and the sheer scope and inherent lack of transparency of the system gives 
cause for concern. In June 2006 there were approximately 450,000 identities listed on 
MAL and a further 2.29 million documents of concern (DIMA 2006). In 2005 the 
Government allocated AU$43.9 million to the development of the MAL, including 
redeveloping the alert system, creating a dedicated 24 hour centre and improving links 
with other Government agencies, particularly the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organization (ASIO). Collectively, these surveillance systems provide generalized 
monitoring of both actual, and intended, crossings of the Australian border.  
 
The border is further delocalized through surveillance practices and information exchange 
involving cooperation with other nation-states, particularly within the Asia Pacific region, 
as outlined in the previous section. In key South East Asian locations, the Australian 
Government is also providing intelligence training for local border patrols and funding the 
installation of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV). Significant funds (AU$6.4 million) 
have been allocated towards assisting Indonesia to enhance its border movement alert 
system (Australian Government 2006: 21). Furthermore, the Australian Government is 
providing $AU10.9 million towards the development of RMAL (Regional Movement 
Alert List). RMAL is an APEC initiative, a connection which reveals the economic 
factors at play in efforts to control cross border movements. After an initial tri-lateral pilot 
involving the US, Australian and New Zealand, the RMAL is intended to become a fully 
operational, regional system. Designed to detect lost, stolen and invalid travel documents 
the system allows real time access to the databases of cooperating nation-states. Work is 
currently underway to expand the database from lost and stolen passports to all passports; 
a move that it claims would “enable authorities to check the validity and authenticity of 
other economy’s travel documents” (APEC 2007). This reflects an enormous investment 
in exclusionary technologies and transnational networks designed, ostensibly, to protect 
national economies, but at a cost to governments which points also to the significant 
political capital accrued through the securitization of borders. 
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Biometrics, Asylum Seekers & Criminalization 
 
We have argued so far that the capacity to secure borders has been a crucial arena in 
which the Australian state has sought to reconfigure mobility as a problem of security. An 
integral aspect of this security politics has been the discursive criminalization of those 
seeking asylum in Australia. This process of criminalization is clearly evident in media 
reporting, which has depicted asylum seekers as deviant, diseased and threatening to 
infect the nation and undermine national sovereignty (Pickering 2001). Public narratives 
in Australia have also constructed refugee identities as “illegal” “fraudulent” and 
“bogus.” The security continuum identified by Huysmans linking border control, 
terrorism, international crime and migration in the European Union has also emerged 
strongly in the Australian context (2000: Pickering 2005). The authority to inscribe 
legitimate and illegitimate identities on those moving across borders is therefore 
positioned within a broader discourse of border security and sovereignty.  
 
It is against this politicized backdrop that the Australian Parliament passed the Migration 
Legislation Amendment (Identification and Authentication) Act 2004. The legislation 
amended the Migration Act 1958, increasing the basis for taking biometric identifiers 
such as photographs, signatures and fingerprints. The proclaimed rationale of the 
legislation is to increase the ability of border authorities to “establish and authenticate the 
identity of non-citizens at various stages of immigration processing, and on entry to and 
departure from Australia (DIMIA 2004). The programme is being generously funded by 
the Australian Commonwealth Government, with $A42.87 million allocated to implement 
“biometric technology for border security and identity management” (Bajkowski 2005). 
Practices such as fingerprinting, can amount to “quasi” or “indirect” criminalization, 
particularly when these requirements are selectively targeted (Weber 2002). Appearing 
before the Australian Senate’s Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, John 
Gibson of the Victorian Bar claimed that the “invasive and demeaning processes” 
inherent in the legislation would “only increase the sense that, in some circumstances, 
particular individuals seeking asylum in Australia are treated worse than criminals” 
(Commonwealth of Australia Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee 
2003: 5-6). 
 
The use of the technology is intertwined in a wider process of criminalization. Facial 
recognition technology, iris scanning and fingerprinting are part of an overall strategy of 
identity management intended to “strengthen identification processes” (DIMIA 2004). 
Asylum seekers are criminalized in the enactment of this initiative through the discursive 
fusing of mobility and criminality, and through their subjection to criminal-justice-like 
procedures. Immigration Department publicity for the measure notes that assembling a 
biometric database of asylum seeker details will: “improve Australia’s border security. It 
will help to fight against the use of sophisticated techniques exploited by terrorists and 
criminals, to change identities and cross international borders” (DIMIA 2004). 
Importantly, technology is promoted as the crucial barrier to fortify permeable borders. 
As the explanatory memorandum to the legislation notes: “it is crucial that Australia has 
the opportunity and ability to participate internationally in combating immigration fraud 
by using current and evolving technologies. In this international environment, Australia 
cannot afford to be seen as a “soft target” by terrorists, people smugglers, forum shoppers 
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and other non-citizens of concern” (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 2003: 
6). Everyone from global terrorists and alleged international criminals, to those seeking a 
receptive location to lodge a claim for refugee protection and forced into illicit modes of 
travel, or people merely attempting to travel without a valid visa, is thereby subsumed 
under the immigration fraud label, justifying a further widening and deepening of the 
surveillance apparatus.  
 
Biometric technologies deployed upon the bodies of asylum seekers serve to intensify the 
securitization of border crossing and the criminalization of persons seeking refuge in 
Australia. The association of illegalized border crossers with biometric technologies fuses 
a disparate array of amorphous dangers – terrorism, organized crime and uncontrolled 
migration – as a single unified threat to national sovereignty. But such documents are also 
crucial signifiers of exclusion. In practice they inscribe on those seeking asylum the 
identity of “non-citizen.” Fixing these “non-citizen” identities through biometric 
documentation magnifies categories of exclusion and reinforces the notion of border 
crossing as a problem of security. Moreover, subjecting asylum seekers to technological 
processes of classification possibly removes them from the discretion that can attend 
interaction with human agents. In the process, human judgements of justice, fairness and 
legitimacy are potentially superseded by automated processes (Lyon 2004: 2). 
 
 
Airports, Kinetic Elites and the Ubiquitous Border 
 
Australian airports have also become pivotal sites where the securitization of mobility is 
enacted. A recent report on Australian airport security noted that airports “embody the 
modern world in all its complexity, since few other places bring together our most 
advanced technological creations and the intricate interconnected systems we have 
devised to serve both those creations and ourselves” (Wheeler 2005: 5). The September 
11 attacks were instrumental in the development of heightened security measures in 
airports across Western nations, and in fixing airports in public consciousness as filters of 
risk (Adey 2004; Lyon 2006b). Airports have subsequently assumed considerable 
symbolic capacity as nodes of risk management and border control (Salter 2007). This 
significance is linked to the crucial role of airports as risk filters where processes of social 
sorting are enacted (Lyon 2006b: 405). Unsurprisingly then, the Australian Government 
has expended considerable resources on fortifying the nation’s airports against potential 
security threats. In 2005 an extensive review of Australian airport security was 
undertaken by Sir John Wheeler, who had conducted a similar review in the UK. 
Following Wheeler’s report, $A200 million was budgeted to facilitate reinforced airport 
security, with measures including enhanced explosive detection technology, augmented 
closed circuit television surveillance, security training and specialized Airport 
Investigation Teams (Howard 2005).  
 
Biometric identification systems are integral risk filters in these emergent regimes of 
intensified security. Examples include the SmartGate Series 1 facial recognition system, 
which is due to commence full scale operation at Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane 
airports in 2007, with other international Australian airports to follow (Australian 
Customs Service 2006a). The SmartGate system allows passengers with “ePassports” to 
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check themselves through Passport Control via a kiosk which takes an image of the 
traveler's face and matches that against the holder's passport image. Between November 
2002 and June 2005 trials were undertaken at Sydney and Melbourne airports, initially 
involving crew of the national carrier Qantas, later followed by selected “frequent flyers.” 
The actual efficacy of the SmartGate system is disputed (Clarke 2004; ABC Online 
2006). Nevertheless, SmartGate Series 1 is to be introduced in 2007. The system 
encapsulates the development noted by those examining contemporary trends in airport 
surveillance where individuals are sorted into slow-moving and fast-moving streams 
(Adey 2006; Lyon 2006b). One of the proclaimed benefits of SmartGate is that it will 
enable Customs Officers to focus on “high-risk” travelers and “enhance the security of the 
Australian border” while simultaneously facilitating the rapid processing of “low-risk” 
travelers (Australian Customs Service 2006a). 
 
The capacity to sort between “low risk” and “high risk,” between desirable and 
undesirable, is intensified through the biometrification of the international passport 
system. Passports are the primary document for identifying, regulating and tracing mobile 
individuals. The passport is, as Salter suggests, “a modern heuristic device which serves 
to link individuals to foreign policy, and according to which government agents classify 
travelers as safe or dangerous, desirable or undesirable, according to national, social or 
political narratives” (Salter 2004: 72). The most frequent rationale given for incorporating 
biometric data into travel documents is “national security” – meaning security from 
“illegal” migrants and those labeled terrorists (Thomas 2005: 16). In Australia the 
potential for passports to facilitate processes of risk profiling and “social sorting” are 
advanced through the implementation of the ePassport, a biometric document using facial 
recognition technology introduced by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (DFAT) in October 2005 (Australian Customs Service 2006b). The ePassport has a 
microchip embedded in the centre page containing a digitized facial image and the 
personal details of the holder (Downer 2005). Australia is issuing biometric passports in 
response to the standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 
Australia’s Foreign Minister has claimed biometric passports will “speed up movements 
through airport controls, boost aviation security and curtail identity theft. It should also 
prove invaluable in the fight against terrorism, people smuggling and other transnational 
crimes” (Downer 2003). However, as Privacy International has suggested, biometric 
passport systems, often justified as a means of combating terrorism, will facilitate the 
compilation of significant national biometric databases while bypassing meaningful 
public debate (2004). This was evident in the passage of the Australian Passports Bill 
2004 which passed through both Houses of the Australian Parliament with support from 
both major political parties. 
 
The Australian Passports Act 2005 has significant implications in terms of data, 
surveillance and citizenship. The broad language of the legislation opens the possibility of 
a database of biometric information for every holder of an Australian passport or travel 
document (Donaldson 2004: 6). A database so assembled could soon begin to function as 
“a de facto national biometric database for use by the Government in a broad range of 
circumstances” (Donaldson 2004: 7). Biometric passports amplify the surveillance and 
database capacity of government. As the International Campaign Against Mass 
Surveillance succinctly suggested, biometric passports represent the potential of obtaining 
“nearly universal registration of everyone on the planet” (2005: 8). Processes of 
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securitization are thus coupled and intertwined with significant extensions of data 
collection and the capacity to process it. The increased interconnection between databases 
and the sharing of information between agencies, and the enhanced classificatory capacity 
this unleashes — as “high risk” rather than “low risk,” or suspected rather than trusted — 
potentially deepens and widens the discriminatory and exclusionary processes of border 
policing (Amoore 2006; Wilson 2006; Muller 2004). As van der Ploeg suggests, 
surveillance practices at the border “produce infinitely better inhabitable identities for 
some people than others” (2006: 193). 
 
Searchable databases generated by biometric passport registration facilitate intensive 
processes of “social sorting” where processes of exclusion and inclusion are deepened and 
extended. In their influential article, Feeley and Simon (1994) suggested that one of the 
characteristics of actuarial justice was the movement of exceptional powers – usually 
reserved for border areas such as airports and border posts – to the internal spaces of the 
nation-state. Such an observation could also be made of surveillance practices and 
technologies, where the compiling of digital databases and the securitization of mobility 





Australian border control is an example of securitization whereby the regulation of 
mobility is separated from human rights and social justice frameworks and configured as 
a problem of security and enforcement. Thus, asylum seekers and other spontaneous 
border crossers are increasingly presented “not as people who have a problem but as 
people who are a problem” (Joly 1997: 35) and the regulation of border crossing is 
positioned within a political and policy process geared towards crime and control. As 
Bauman suggests, this is a process that moves towards a “logic of exclusion and 
fortification” (2000: 205). Surveillance practices and technologies are integral 
components within this process of exclusion and fortification. In the Australian context 
Advance Passenger Processing, the Movement Alert List, the Regional Movement Alert 
List, the biometric identification of asylum seekers and the introduction of the ePassport 
are constitutive and symbolic components of the securitization of mobility. These 
searchable databases and biometric identification systems engaged in the mission of 
social sorting at the border are not impartial. As Graham and Wood note of digital 
surveillance systems, while they may be characterized by flexibility and ambivalence, and 
contingent upon judgments of social and economic worth built into their design, they are 
“likely to be strongly biased by the political, economic and social conditions that shape 
the principles embedded in their design and implementation” (2003: 229).  
 
The expansion of the technological capacity of databases, combined with human policing, 
has resulted in the intensive escalation of surveillance and preemptive practices at and 
beyond the Australian border. We have already noted that Australian border control 
measures are heavily freighted with political symbolism. However such measures also 
have important practical consequences, which follow from the processes of social sorting 
as outlined by Lyon (2003). In the case of asylum seekers and other border crossers, the 
normative prescriptions of  international human rights law are especially fragile, and are 
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easily set aside in the transnational, informated spaces in which preemptive border control 
occurs. Technocratic sorting practices at international airports use aggregate risk profiles 
to actively and routinely differentiate authorized and suspect travellers for differential 
treatment, primarily on the basis of nationality and ethnicity, thereby creating new 
channels of inequality (Wonders 2006). The material consequences of systemic failures to 
identify individuals in need of protection at the Australian border, and their possible 
return to places of danger, are potential breaches of Australia’s human rights obligations 
(Taylor 2005b).  
 
Surveillance technologies are thus deployed within a social context and organizing logic 
that inevitably heads towards exclusionary rather than inclusive functioning. This 
amplifies the potential for “actuarial justice” rather than social justice, where the objective 
is risk management and where predictors of dangerousness are engaged to pre-emptively 
target “problem” populations (Feeley & Simon 1994). That such informated spaces are 
being compiled within a “state of exception,” where decisions are increasingly based 
upon political will rather than the constraints of normative law, is further cause for 
concern (Agamben 2005). Surveillance technologies and practices positioned within a 
frame of security and control diminish the spaces that human rights and social justice 
might occupy. It is therefore imperative that scholars interrogate the ways in which spaces 
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